There is a sense of entitlement in the assertion that those who sacrificed their youth to the armed struggle have a right to lead and govern. This sense of entitlement introduces a real dilemma in that those who fought hard for freedom and who feel strongly that they should enjoy the spoils of being in government do not necessarily have the capacity to govern. The right to govern a modern, sophisticated socio-economic and political system has to be balanced with the right of citizens to be governed competently. Most freedom fighters lack the most basic skills needed for good governance. Their military training as guerrilla fighters has not necessarily prepared them for the value-based approach to governance which is central to our constitutional democracy.
The transformation of the state from one that served a minority government into one that serves the majority is a task that has yet to be achieved. The focus thus far has been on taking control of the state, rather than on transforming it into a platform for democratic governance. This should come as no surprise at all because South Africa is no exception to other post-colonial experiences. The driving force of freedom fighters was opposition to the injustices committed by the discriminatory colonial conquerors who ruled them and little space was devoted to defining and discussing alternative systems.
Alternatives such as the Unity Movement’s Ten Point Programme, the ANC’s Freedom Charter and the PAC’s ‘Africa for Africans’ that were defined during the struggle were sketchy and the realities they painted had been overtaken by the shifting political and economic realities by the time freedom came. The negotiated settlement that ushered in democracy in 1994 and the adoption of the national constitution in 1996 do not seem to have laid a strong enough foundation for good government. Increasing public rhetoric about returning to the Freedom Charter as the supreme guiding document for economic policy reflects the failure of the new dispensation to anchor economic governance within the framework and values of the national constitution. Harking back to the Freedom Charter, a 1955 document adopted by a sector of the population of the time, is a political game that has less to do with the ideals of that document than with positioning a segment of the ANC in the leadership struggle for the 2012 elective conference.
Even if one were to accept post-liberation frameworks such as the Freedom Charter, one has to acknowledge that they suffered from inadequate space for internal debates to spell out the details and alternative policy options that were being proposed. At the time security concerns as well as lack of skills curtailed the level of open participation by ordinary members of liberation movements. Much of what passes as the people’s documents was drafted by a few people in the elite leadership of the liberation movement. This much was admitted to by Ben Turok in the case of the Freedom Charter.34 It is one thing to pronounce on what is to be, but totally another for a society to understand the implications of policy options put to it. Moreover, specific instances such as nationalisation as understood in the mid-1950s raise a totally different set of policy challenges in the twenty-first century.
An even bigger challenge in acknowledging the inadequacy of skills to govern in post-apartheid South Africa is the historical racist notion of associating black people with lack of knowledge and skill. This association was used to justify exclusion of black people from representation and governance of their countries during the colonial period. The operating principle of colonial governments was to install ‘civilised government’ over barbaric people. Even so-called progressive liberal political parties in the late colonial period bought into the notion of a qualified franchise that set educational and other criteria for acceptance as a citizen with the right to vote.
The cruel irony of the inequity of excluding people from exercising their democratic rights on grounds of lack of educational and social standing was lost on many colonialists. How could they justify the fairness of a qualified franchise whilst denying the majority population access to education? The consequence of this inequity is that it provides a moral argument for dismissing meritocracy as a basis for post-colonial public service. It also provides the political cover for those in government not acknowledging lack of skills and knowledge, for this would be buying into the notion that black people are not ready to govern.
Tragically, even in those cases where liberation movements sent their people for training in anticipation of the requirements for governing modern systems, many of those skilled people were not necessarily utilised in the post-colonial period. Of those who were utilised, few survived beyond the heady days after Uhuru. The stresses and strains of running a democracy soon overpowered the idealism of comradeship. Senior political leaders seldom manage to put their personal insecurities aside in favour of using the best available talents and skills to meet the needs of society. Many talented public servants became marginalised and some were literally hounded out of jobs because they disagreed with their former comrades on what was technically appropriate for sustainable development.
Another major challenge for liberation movements has been how to make the transition from liberators to governing political parties. The skills set required of liberation movement leaders is in material respects different from that required for governance in complex modern socio-economic and political systems. Many of those who were at the forefront of the freedom struggle were often uneducated and were led by a very small band of educated elite. Liberation movement leaders, especially those engaged in waging wars against their oppressors, had a style of leadership appropriate for the task at hand. Authoritarianism is functional in a militaristic institutional environment, but not in a democratic one and the technical skills essential for governance and managing modern socio-economic systems in a democratic polity were not a focus of liberation movements.
Governing a modern polity and economy has never been as complex as it is today in our interdependent and interconnected competitive world. When we made the change in our polity in 1994 South Africa had a head start in inheriting a sophisticated economy and the basic infrastructure needed to drive economic growth. We were also blessed with a government that understood the importance of transforming the macro-economic system we inherited that had served the privileged minority but was inappropriate as a platform for a modern open economy.
Much of the early success was attributable to the skilled people who were both retained from the past and recruited to champion and restructure our macro-economy. The same focus on skills has stood our Revenue Service in good stead and turned it into one the most efficient, progressive, and transparent tax systems in the world. Other areas of governance in the first post-apartheid administration such as Water and Forestry under the late Kader Asmal, Justice and the Judiciary System under the late Abdullah Omar, and Agriculture and Land Affairs under Derek Hanekom, were also headed by competent people who were able to set the frameworks for good governance on sound scientific foundations.
But the success of the economic sectors has not translated into prosperity on the ground for the majority. A major weakness in all post-apartheid administrations has been in translating excellent macro-level policies into effective implementable programmes. For example, macro-economic stability has not been accompanied by effective micro-economic interventions to promote entrepreneurship through small and medium enterprises that hold the greatest promise of employment and livelihoods. We have witnessed jobless growth in our post-apartheid environment whilst unemployment has grown to alarming proportions, especially amongst young people. What is missing is a transformative economic policy framework driven by a competent public service.
